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1
  
 
This article explores the forms of moral repair that the wrongdoer has to 
perform in an attempt to make amends for her past wrongdoing, with a 
focus on the issues of interpersonal moral repair; that is, what a 
wrongdoer can do to merit her victim‘s forgiveness and achieve 
reconciliation with her community. The article argues against the very 
general demands of atonement that amount to an obligation to stop being 
someone who commits wrongs—to become a ―moral saint‖—and 
suggests a new form of atonement that is more practical and useful in our 
everyday life. 
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1 
Following Margaret Urban Walker, we can use the term ―moral 
repair‖ to refer to efforts that are made to respond in a morally 
appropriate way to wrongdoing (Walker 2007). One form of moral 
repair that has received a lot of attention in recent years is 
forgiveness.
2
 Victims are often able to resolve the lingering effects of 
past conflicts by forgiving the people who have mistreated them. 
Others, who were bystanders or witnesses to a wrong, can also 
contribute to moral repair, as when the neighbors of a victim tend to 
his injuries or join in the call for justice. States and other authoritative 
bodies contribute to moral repair by punishing wrongdoers or 
compelling them to pay restitution. The forms of moral repair that I 
will explore here, however, are those that the wrongdoer herself 
performs in an attempt to correct her own misdeeds. I use the term 
―atonement‖ to stand for the transgressor‘s efforts to make amends for 
past wrongdoing. Atonement is discussed most frequently in 
specifically theological contexts, where the question is how a sinner is 
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to become reconciled with God. However, my attention will be 
restricted to issues of interpersonal moral repair. What can a 
wrongdoer do to merit her victim‘s forgiveness? How can she achieve 
reconciliation with her community?  
In this essay, I will summarize the account of atonement that I have 
developed in more detail elsewhere (Radzik 2009). Then I will explain 
a worry I have about the account: the scope of the obligation to atone 
threatens to become unwieldy, such that it appears that we can atone 
for our past misdeeds only by becoming morally perfect people, or 
―moral saints.‖ I do not have a solution to this problem as much as a 
general strategy for living with it. While I remain committed to the 
importance of the wrongdoer‘s contribution to moral repair, the 
problem of defining the scope of the obligation to atone indicates that 
moral repair requires the cooperation and good will of all the parties to 
a conflict—wrongdoers, victims, and sometimes communities as well. 
2 
In atoning, then, the wrongdoer works to repair his wrongful actions. 
In this essay, my concern is not with the entire class of wrongful 
actions, but only those in which there is an identifiable human victim 
(i.e., in which one person or group has wronged another person or 
group).
3
 The intuition that the wrongdoer must do something to 
respond to his misdeed is strong. He should feel sorry about what he 
has done. He should apologize. He should try to make amends to his 
victim. These moral claims are familiar, and we feel quite confident in 
asserting them. The challenge for the philosopher is to explain why 
these sorts of responses are morally required of the wrongdoer and to 
explore more fully the appropriateness of particular forms of 
responses.  
In my study of this topic, I found that accounts of the wrongdoer‘s 
obligation usually fit one of three basic patterns. Atonement is 
generally conceived of as either the repayment of a debt, a moral 
transformation of the wrongdoer, or the reconciliation of relationships. 
While proponents of these different perspectives often agree about the 
steps that wrongdoers should take (e.g., apologizing), they differ in 
their understandings of why such steps are necessary. These 
differences are rooted in even deeper disagreements about the nature 
of the problem that atonement must solve. In other words, proponents 
of these competing models of atonement have different views of what 
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stands in need of repair. In this section, I will summarize the 
repayment and the moral transformation models of atonement and 
briefly indicate my worries about them. Section 3 will defend a 
reconciliation account of atonement. 
The repayment model takes seriously the economic imagery that is 
so common in the language of morality. When I mistreat another 
person, I fail to pay her the respect that is her due. In damaging her 
dignity, her belongings, or her body, I place myself in her debt. The 
size of the debt corresponds to the severity of the wrong. Wrongdoing 
is conceived of as a kind of wrongful taking; it follows, then, that 
atonement is a matter of repaying that debt.  
This conception of atonement as a form of repayment is usually 
developed in two distinct but related ways: as restitution or as 
retribution. Restitution requires a transfer to the victim of something 
of value that is intended to replace or compensate for what was lost.
4
 
For example, if I wrongfully damaged my friend‘s computer, then I 
must repair or replace the computer. If I wrongfully caused her a 
bodily injury, then I may try to settle the debt by paying her doctor‘s 
bills, performing services that she can no longer perform for herself 
(such as housework), or offering a cash payment for her pain and 
suffering. On a restitution model, apologies are often interpreted as 
valuable gestures of respect offered in compensation for earlier harms. 
The second way in which the repayment model of atonement is 
commonly developed is in terms of retribution or punishment.
5
 
Whereas the language of restitution calls for the victim to receive 
something of value in compensation for what she lost, the language of 
retribution emphasizes the importance of the wrongdoer personally 
losing something of value in order to negate his wrongful taking. The 
wrongdoer must repay the debt with his own suffering, loss, or 
sacrifice. Atonement requires the wrongdoer to punish himself or 
submit to punishment at the hands of others. He might do this by 
suffering the pangs of guilt, by humbling himself through apology, or, 
in the case of crimes, by turning himself over to the authorities. The 
historical link between the concept of punishment and the concept of 
repayment appears in the etymology of the word ―retribution‖; ―re‖ 
plus ―tribuo‖ is Latin for ―pay back‖ (Cottingham 1979).  
I have described restitution and retribution as two ways in which 
the repayment model of atonement is made more precise. The 
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differences between them are worth noticing. For example, someone 
other than the wrongdoer can compensate a victim for a loss. The 
wrongdoer‘s friend could step in to pay medical bills. If what we 
really care about is just that the victim receive compensation, then it 
would appear that the work of moral repair could be completed 
without the wrongdoer‘s participation. Yet, surely the wrongdoer 
himself has an obligation to respond to the wrongful act. So, a major 
flaw in the restitution version of the repayment model is that it fails 
to explain why the wrongdoer‘s participation in moral repair is 
so important. 
In response to this problem with the restitution model, defenders of 
retribution often draw a distinction between harms and wrongs. 
Restitution is owed as a response to the causing of harm, but not all 
harms are wrongful. Suppose I must break into your mountain cabin in 
order to take shelter from a life-threatening winter storm. My action is 
justified; I have not wronged you. However, I have damaged your 
property. Restitution must be paid for that harm, but whether it is paid 
by me or by a friend of mine makes no difference. Wrongs, on the 
other hand, are a different matter. Suppose I broke into your cabin 
wrongfully, simply to amuse myself. My friend might be able to pay 
for the damage I cause to the door, but he cannot repair the wrong for 
me. Repairing the wrong, claim the retributivists, requires the 
punishment or self-punishment of the wrongdoer. A moral debt can 
only be repaid with the coin of the wrongdoer‘s own suffering.  
But the retribution model of atonement faces a problem that 
mirrors the one faced by the restitution model. Whereas we worried 
that restitution can be made without involving the wrongdoer, it seems 
that retribution can occur without involving the victim. The 
wrongdoer might punish himself, or be punished by others, without 
the victim being aware of this fact. And even where the victim is 
aware of the wrongdoer‘s suffering, it is hard to see why that suffering 
should be described as the repayment of a debt to her. It is true that 
victims sometimes do benefit from the punishment of a wrongdoer. 
For example, if punishment has a deterrent effect, then the victim 
faces a lower risk of being victimized in the future. But retributivist 
accounts (both in the literature on atonement and the literature on 
criminal punishment) make no appeal to the good consequences of 
punishment in their theories. Punishment is presented as the 
intrinsically appropriate response to wrongdoing, just as repayment is 
the intrinsically appropriate response to debt. One ought to repay a 
financial debt even if the creditor will only put the funds to poor use. 
One ought to suffer over one‘s wrongdoing whether or not it leads to 
benefits such as deterrence. 
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Retributivists say that the suffering of the wrongdoer is necessary 
to repay the moral debt. But, again, what good is that suffering to the 
victim? Are we meant to believe that victims find the suffering of their 
abusers intrinsically pleasing? Some retributivists embrace this result 
(Hershenov 1999). Others deny that such a vengeful, bloodthirsty 
image of the victim must be part of the retributivist picture; they try to 
develop some other account of why retribution is intrinsically valuable 
for the victim (Murphy and Hampton 1988; Hampton 1992). I cannot 
pursue this line of debate in sufficient depth here, but elsewhere I 
argue that these attempts do not work (Radzik 2009). While 
punishment is sometimes (but not always) instrumentally valuable to 
victims, victims should not intrinsically value the suffering of their 
abusers.  
While both restitution and punishment have a role to play in the 
story of atonement, neither one seems to provide on its own a fully 
satisfactory guide to the wrongdoer‘s obligations in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing. Nor can we simply add the two principles together. Even 
if a wrongdoer has both paid compensation to his victim and 
submitted to punishment for his misdeed, this does not provide 
everything that we care about in the aftermath of wrongdoing. After 
all, this same wrongdoer could perform these actions without ever 
giving up his contemptuous view of his victim or his intention to 
repeat his transgression at the first opportunity. What is missing, it 
seems, is repentance.  
This brings us to the second of the three main approaches to 
atonement—the moral transformation model.6 Whereas the repayment 
model conceives of wrongdoing as the incursion of a debt, the moral 
transformation model depicts wrongdoing as a problem within the 
wrongdoer‘s soul or mind. She has taken the wrong path; she has 
turned away from the right and the good. In order to make amends, 
she needs to reorient herself. Atonement requires repentance. The 
wrongdoer must accept that her past action was wrong and that she 
was responsible for it. She must regret her transgression. Further, she 
must sincerely commit herself to living according to proper values in 
the future.  
The claim that repentance is necessary for atonement is a 
compelling one. However, repentance seems not to be sufficient for 
atonement. After all, the wrongdoer could regret her past and 
recommit herself to better values while failing to apologize to her 
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victim or to compensate him for the harms she caused him. Defenders 
of moral transformation models of atonement tend to argue that, when 
repentance is sincere, the wrongdoer will be motivated to actions such 
as apology and compensation as well. But we are unable to explain 
why these actions are required, or to give a satisfactory account of 
why some forms of apology or compensation are preferable to others, 
with the materials that are generally provided by moral transformation 
accounts of wrongdoing. When the problem that wrongdoing poses is 
represented exclusively as a problem in the transgressor‘s soul or 
mind, we fail to properly acknowledge the stake that other parties 
(especially the victim) have in the aftermath of wrongdoing. 
3 
While there is much to be learned from repayment and moral 
transformation models of atonement, I find both alternatives lacking. 
As the discussion above emphasizes, the different versions of these 
models threaten to leave out one of the important stakeholders in the 
aftermath of wrongdoing. We can improve upon the repayment and 
moral transformation accounts of atonement by turning to the third 
general model of atonement: reconciliation. 
Like the other accounts of atonement we have seen, the 
reconciliation model has at its heart a metaphor.
7
 Here, wrongdoing is 
represented not as the incursion of a debt or as the losing of one‘s path 
but as a rending of the social fabric. Wrongdoing tears at the threads 
of mutual respect and trust that properly bind us to one another. 
Atonement aims to mend that fabric. In atoning, the wrongdoer works 
to reconcile her relationships with those people who have been 
alienated from her by her wrongful actions.
8
  
A reconciliation model of atonement is supported by the 
observation that wrongs are events that do not stay neatly isolated in 
the past. As Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton have argued, this is 
because wrongful actions have a kind of expressive content (Murphy 
and Hampton 1988). To wrong someone is to send the message that 
one does not find his value sufficiently high so as to preclude such an 
action. The wrongdoer may not intend to communicate such a 
message, but actions are taken as evidence of attitudes. In this way, 
wrongful actions insult their victims. Furthermore, because past 
actions and attitudes are indications of future behavior, wrongdoing 
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generally suggests a threat of future mistreatment. In these ways, 
wrongful acts poison the future relationship between the victim and 
the wrongdoer.  
Wrongs may also damage the relationships among both the victim 
and the wrongdoer and members of their communities. People who 
were privy to the wrong, and to the insulting messages that it 
communicated, might be led to see the victim as unworthy of better 
treatment. Alternatively, these witnesses may take a lower view of the 
wrongdoer, regarding her with indignation and mistrust. Additionally, 
the experience of being mistreated can lead the victim to feel degraded 
and low. We can say that his relationship with himself has been 
damaged. Similarly, in doing wrong, the wrongdoer may damage her 
relationship with herself. She may feel corrupted and untrustworthy. 
In sum, we have a myriad of relationships among victims, 
wrongdoers, and their fellows that may be damaged or threatened by 
wrongdoing. In order to atone, the wrongdoer must repair these 
relationships to the best of her ability.  
In talking about relationships, I mean to bring attention to the ways 
in which people interact, their expectations of one another, and the 
attitudes and emotions they hold toward one another or toward 
themselves. Different kinds of relationship are distinguishable by 
different sets of interactions, expectations, attitudes and emotions. 
One‘s relationship with one‘s child differs in many ways from one‘s 
relationship with one‘s co-workers. But whatever our particular, 
personal relationships to other people, we also always stand in another 
sort of relationship to other human beings. We stand in what I will call 
the ―moral relationship.‖ Even wrongs that take place between 
strangers passing one another on the street can be described as 
damaging relationships, because even strangers are bound by moral 
norms in their interactions, expectations, and attitudes toward one 
another.  
This understanding of moral relationships—and of the norms that 
should regulate the interactions, expectations, attitudes, and emotions 
that are constitutive of it—is rooted in a broadly Kantian perspective. 
A proper relationship, whether among strangers or intimate friends, is 
one in which the parties regard one another and themselves as equally 
valuable moral persons. They view each other as beings who are 
capable of judging right from wrong and regulating their behavior by 
these judgments. This moral agency gives them a particular kind of 
value, which Kant describes as ―dignity‖ rather than ―price‖ (Kant 
1996). Furthermore, when a relationship is morally healthy, people 
view one another and themselves as reasonably trustworthy in moral 
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matters. The repair and maintenance of such relationships is the goal 
of atonement.  
When reconciliation has been made, the victim, who was 
denigrated by the wrongful action, can now be confident that he is 
being granted proper respect by the wrongdoer, in the view of the 
community that is privy to the wrong, and in his own eyes. The 
wrongdoer will be regarded by her victim and community as someone 
who is not only capable of moral action but also worthy of a normal 
degree of trust with respect to the type of interaction in question. She 
will also be able to regard herself as valuable and trustworthy once 
more, and feelings of guilt may permissibly subside.  
In addition to the moral relationship, victims and wrongdoers also 
occupy all sorts of more particular, personal relationships. 
Unfortunately, even if a wrongdoer responds to her transgressions in a 
fully morally satisfactory way, this will not always be sufficient to 
repair the personal relationship. Friends who have been separated by a 
serious betrayal of trust might never again achieve the level of 
personal intimacy they had before the wrongful action. Still, I believe 
that the wrongdoer should be counted as having satisfied her moral 
obligation to atone to her friend when she has given him good reason 
to accept that she is once again reasonably trustworthy in the domain 
of friendship. That is, even though their own friendship is over, the 
victim recognizes that the wrongdoer has shown herself to be someone 
who can be trusted in the role of friend (to someone else) in the future. 
The wrongdoer‘s obligation to atone consists in an obligation to create 
the conditions in which this more modest sort of reconciliation can 
take place.  
How can the wrongdoer merit the restoration of her place as 
member in good standing in the moral community? She must attend to 
the ways in which her relationships were damaged or threatened by 
the original wrong. In most cases, three steps must be taken by the 
wrongdoer. The first is respectful communication. The wrongdoer 
must acknowledge her misdeed in a way that communicates regret and 
renewed respect, and that invites the victim‘s own response. Secondly, 
the wrongdoer must act to repair the various kinds of harm she has 
created, insofar as that is possible. These might include financial, 
emotional, or physical harms. To leave those harms unrepaired is to 
allow her victim to continue to suffer from the wrong she committed; 
it is to continue to give the victim reason to resent and distrust her. 
Thirdly, the wrongdoer must reform herself so that she becomes 
morally trustworthy. She must address the flaws in her character that 
led to the wrongful act so as to provide both others and herself with 
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good reason to accept that she will not repeat this sort of misdeed. 
Through this process the wrongdoer provides her victim, her 
community, and herself with good reason to reestablish the respect 
and trust that are distinctive of relationships in a moral community. 
I believe that the reconciliation model of atonement has many 
advantages over the repayment and moral transformation models. 
First, unlike those alternatives, the reconciliation model never loses 
sight of the fact that the wrongdoer and the victim are both central to 
the project of atonement. Furthermore, the reconciliation model 
recognizes that wrongdoing between individuals can infect larger 
communities. Proper atonement requires a response to that sort of 
damage as well. The reconciliation model includes the insights of the 
moral transformation model, in that atonement requires the wrongdoer 
to make herself morally trustworthy once more. Restitution has a 
place as well. Since unaddressed harms damage relationships of 
mutual respect and trust, relational repair requires restitution. The 
reconciliation model can even incorporate what is worth preserving in 
the retribution model. Practices of self-punishment or submission to 
punishment sometimes have a role to play in the aftermath of 
wrongdoing. But whereas the retribution model claimed that these 
responses were intrinsically valuable, the reconciliation model values 
them only insofar as they are instrumental to rebuilding relationships 
of trust among the parties to wrongdoing.  
4 
An objection to this reconciliation account of atonement, which I will 
explore in the remainder of this essay, has to do with the scope of the 
obligation to atone. The account requires wrongdoers to make 
themselves morally trustworthy. But how much is entailed by this 
requirement? In theological circles, the ideal of atonement is 
frequently linked with the command to ―go forth and sin no more,‖ 
but this is surely too high a standard. If this is what atonement 
requires, who would even attempt it? The early history of the 
Christian Church provides a cautionary tale. It was once the case that 
the penitential rites in the Church could be performed only once. If 
one received absolution, then one had better behave perfectly from 
then on because there would be no fixing new sins. Predictably, 
people put off the sacrament until they were convinced they were 
dying. Understandably, the Church decided it was better to change 
those rules and encourage frequent confession and reconciliation 
instead. In developing a secular conception of atonement for 
wrongdoing, I too want to avoid the suggestion that atoning for a 
wrong requires you to become a moral saint. Requiring perfection 
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discourages improvement. But when I start dealing with particular 
cases, I find that the slopes can get rather slippery.  
Let‘s imagine a particular wrongdoer, named Don. At first it seems 
intuitive that Don can right the particular wrongful act of cheating on 
his wife, Betty, while failing to repair misdeeds in other parts of his 
life, such as bullying his co-workers. He could work hard to repair his 
relationship with Betty and count as having atoned to her, even though 
his relationship with his co-workers remains problematic and calls for 
other, separate acts of atonement. In favor of this position, we could 
argue that moral improvement is something that admits of degrees. 
Celebrating the advances Don makes would encourage him to address 
his other moral failings. This suggests that we should believe that a 
wrongdoer is capable of successfully atoning for one act without 
addressing all of the moral failings in his life. 
But has Don successfully atoned for one act of marital infidelity 
when he later has another affair with a different woman? The second 
affair is evidence that the degree of moral improvement required for 
the former atonement failed. The later wrong so closely matches the 
earlier one, being the same type of wrong committed against the same 
victim, Betty, that it seems to invalidate Don‘s first attempt at 
atonement. Again, this seems to be the right answer. Don‘s affairs are 
connected with one another and with deeper issues in his relationship 
with Betty and in his character. Even if Betty has signaled a 
willingness to forgive the former affair, she would be gullible 
indeed if that forgiveness were left unshaken by the revelation of the 
latter affair.  
Notice, however, that in other, less serious cases of wrongdoing, 
this principle seems too severe. Don forgets his lunch appointment 
with his friend Roger and sincerely apologizes. Six months and many 
lunches later, he forgets again. Here, the repetition of wrong and 
victim probably does not invalidate Don‘s earlier apology. 
Let us inquire a little further. Is there anything Don can do to count 
as atoning to Betty for his multiple affairs if he continues to deceive her 
about their finances? One might argue that, in order to atone for his 
marital infidelity, Don must come to recognize that Betty deserves 
better than to be deceived. How can he achieve this goal if he continues 
to deceive her in other ways? His lies about their finances undermines 
the claim that he has morally improved himself in one of the aspects of 
his character that is directly relevant to the transgression of adultery.  
Could Don atone for cheating on Betty if he fails to do his fair 
share of the housework and childcare? This unfairness, after all, could 
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be described as involving the same sort of moral failing as the marital 
infidelity. Both are cases of treating Betty unfairly, or, even more 
generally, of failing to respect Betty as an equally valuable moral 
person. If this line of reasoning is plausible, then we must reconsider 
Don‘s bullying demeanor at the office, where, in different ways and to 
different degrees, there are many people whom he fails to treat as 
equally valuable moral persons. If we diagnose Don‘s marital 
infidelity as a failure to recognize the dignity of other persons, then, to 
repair that wrong, he will have to stop doing that sort of thing; he will 
have to reform his character so that he stops doing that sort of thing. 
Now it looks like we are requiring Don to become a moral saint in 
order to atone for his affair. 
The moral saint problem can be classified as a ―slippery slope‖ 
objection. The reconciliation model of atonement appears to be 
unacceptable because it seems unable to draw a line between the 
reasonable and the unreasonable demands that we might place on a 
wrongdoer. What makes this slope slippery? I have argued that to 
atone for a wrong, a wrongdoer has to reform himself, including the 
relevant part of his character that led to the wrongful act, so as to 
become morally trustworthy in the future with respect to the sort of 
wrong in question. However, any particular case of a wrongful action 
can be described in multiple ways. The transgression that was Don‘s 
having a romantic liaison with another woman can be described as a 
case of marital infidelity towards Betty, as deceiving Betty, as being 
unfair towards Betty and, yet more generally, as violating the moral 
value of another person (without even specifying Betty as the victim). 
The character flaw that the transgression revealed could be described 
as infidelity, deceptiveness, unfairness, or as immorality in the fully 
general sense of not regarding other people as equally deserving of 
respect. Don‘s transgression can be accurately labeled at each of these 
levels of description. This is what seems to lead us to the conclusion 
that, in order for Don to repair any particular wrong, he will have to 
become a moral saint. 
5 
As I have said, my goal is not so much to solve the moral saint 
problem as to learn to live with it. I do not want to solve the problem 
because there is a sense in which it is true that Don (and the rest of us) 
should become moral saints. Each of our particular moral failures 
points to our general moral flaws, which we ought to repair. When we 
talk at the level of moral philosophy, all of that is true. But when we 
are living our lives, we are not better off when we demand perfection 
from ourselves, or the people who mistreat us. I would like to 
16 / Religious Inquiries 4 
articulate a conception of the obligation to atone that we can live with, 
one that offers a principled way to stop short of demanding moral 
saintliness as necessary for righting the wrongs of everyday life.  
The conception of moral repair as the reparation of relationships is 
helpful here. When we ask how Don is to repair his misdeed, the 
demands of atonement tend to scale up because the misdeed can be 
accurately described at so many different levels of abstraction. Let‘s 
instead ask how Don is going to repair the damage his misdeed did to 
his relationship with Betty. To answer this question, we have to 
consider not (or not primarily) how Don is going to satisfy the 
demands of an abstract principle, but how Don is going to satisfy 
Betty. Betty‘s view of the wrong—her own description of the 
transgression, why it was objectionable and harmful, and how it has 
affected her ability to trust Don—will play the major role in defining 
for Don what he needs to do in order to make amends. Depending on 
Betty‘s point of view, she may be more disturbed by the fact that he 
had a sexual encounter with someone else, or by the lying, or by the 
fact that the affair is just one more example of how Don has 
maintained his own life, independent of her and the children, while 
her own life has been entirely subsumed to the family. She probably 
does not care about the affair as an immoral act per se. All of these 
characterizations of the misdeed are true, but not all of them are 
equally crucial to Betty and her relationship with Don—to her ability 
to see him once more as a reasonably trustworthy partner, whether or 
not their marriage survives. 
Betty‘s role in the project of moral repair can keep the moral saint 
problem at bay in another way as well. Betty has reason not to demand 
moral saintliness from Don as a condition for her forgiveness or 
reconciliation, because she knows that she will not be able to live up 
to that standard when she will someday need Don‘s (or someone 
else‘s) forgiveness. If the goal of atonement is moral reconciliation, 
then the victim‘s own standards for atonement might help to keep the 
slope from getting too slippery.  
Betty should be permitted to decide what she needs from Don by 
way of atonement—at least within certain limits. Betty cannot demand 
a form of atonement that is immoral in itself (for example, that Don 
physically harm the woman with whom he had the affair). Betty‘s 
demanding too little from Don may also be a sign of a problem. Don 
has not atoned properly if he meets a low standard that Betty sets forth 
only because she has lost all sense of herself as a person who deserves 
decent treatment, or because she is so trapped by the circumstances of 
her life that she cannot risk losing Don‘s support.  
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A more difficult problem with letting Betty set the standards for 
Don‘s atonement has to do with the limits of her knowledge, limits 
that are themselves the results of Don‘s lies. Her standards for an 
acceptable atonement will surely be lower if she falsely believes that 
this is the only affair Don has ever had. Also, whether Betty sees the 
sexual infidelity or the lying as the more important aspect of Don‘s 
transgression would likely change if she found out that Don has been 
lying to her about their finances as well. Even if Betty does not have 
all the facts, Don does. He cannot honestly take Betty‘s particular 
demands as authoritative—as defining the extent of his obligation to 
atone to her—when he knows that she would set other standards if 
only he was not deceiving her. But, still, we need not conclude that 
Don must become a moral saint in order to make amends with Betty.  
A related point that will help us avoid demanding moral saintliness 
has to do with the nature of trust and trustworthiness. Recall the 
example of Don forgetting his lunch appointment with Roger. Roger 
accepts his apology. When Don forgets again six months later, Roger 
does not take this as a reason to revoke his earlier forgiveness. In 
forgiving, Roger re-accepted Don as a trustworthy lunch companion, 
but the bar for being a trustworthy lunch companion does not require 
infallibility. In judging someone to be morally trustworthy, we are 
always judging relative to the particular kind of interaction in 
question. A friend remains trustworthy though he forgets a lunch date 
every once in a while, in part because so little is at stake. In trusting a 
spouse to be faithful much more is at stake. Betty is justified in 
wanting a greater degree of assurance that Don will not repeat his 
infidelities. By attending to the particular relationship that needs to be 
repaired, and to the kind of trust that is necessary to keep that 
relationship healthy and morally acceptable, we will find standards of 
atonement that are appropriate to the case yet stop short of a demand 
for saintliness. 
6 
What does a wrongdoer have to do in order to atone for a misdeed? I 
have argued that a wrongdoer needs to repair the moral relationships 
that were damaged or threatened by her misdeed, and that this requires 
her to respectfully acknowledge wrongdoing, repair the harms to the 
best of her ability, and reform her character. But depending on how 
we identify the wrong, we will get different conclusions about what is 
required for atonement. Because any particular transgression can be 
described in very general terms as a moral wrong, there is cause to 
worry that the demands of atonement would be very general too; the 
obligation to atone would amount to an obligation to ―stop being 
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someone who commits wrongs.‖ If atonement requires moral 
perfection, it forfeits its usefulness as a guide to our thinking about 
everyday life. In this essay, I have argued that we can avoid this 
problem by conceiving of atonement, not as the demand of an abstract 
morality, but as a demand that we make of one another within the 
context of real, imperfect relationships. 
One consequence of this move is that the project of atonement 
becomes intertwined with other forms of moral repair. The scope of 
Don‘s obligation to atone to Betty is set by the demands she makes of 
him—but only insofar as Betty‘s demands are reasonable and morally 
permissible. To fully think through the ethics of moral repair, we must 
also think of the moral obligations that victims, and perhaps 
communities as well, have the aftermath of wrongdoing. Genuine 
moral repair may only be possible when each of these parties plays 
their role properly.
9
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